

There was no defense of it.¹ It was an undisputed fact that celibacy was not scriptural or primitive.² At that time "all orders, from bishops down, without shame or concealment, were publicly married and lived with their wives as laymen, leaving their children fully provided for in their wills. . . . This laxity prevailed throughout the whole of Latin Christendom, sacerdotal marriage being everywhere so common that it was no longer punished as unlawful and scarcely even reprehended."³ "Not a thought of the worldly advantages consequent on the reform appears to have crossed the mind of Damian. To him it was simply a matter of conscience that the ministers of Christ should be adorned with the austere purity through which alone lay the path to salvation. Accordingly, the arguments which he employs in his endless disputations carefully avoid the practical reasons which were the principal motive for enforcing celibacy. His main reliance was on the assumption that, as Christ was born of a virgin, so he should be served and the eucharist be handled only by virgins."⁴ This took up again the fifth-century doctrine in its popular form, but it evidently led directly up to the heresy that the validity or benefit of the sacrament depended on the purity of the priest. In his zeal for celibacy Hildebrand fell into this heresy, although a man was burned for it at Cambrai in 1041.⁵ Hildebrand also gave civil authorities power over ecclesiastics in order to carry out his reform.⁶ In the middle of the twelfth century the "reform" was directed against the women (wives), for fear of the resistance of the men. In Rome the women were enslaved and given to the church of the Lateran. All bishops were ordered to seize the women for the benefit of their churches.⁷ In 1095 the

sacrament of marriage was declared by the lateran council less potent than the religious vow, although the contrary had been the church doctrine.⁸ Thus what came out of the popular mores underwent the growth

¹ *Sac. f>/#.*, 250, 252.

² *Canon Law*, can. XIII, dist. IvL; Aquinas, *Sum.*, II, 2, qu. 186, art. 4, sec. 3.

⁸ Lea, *Sac. Celib.*, ^ 187.

⁴ *Ibid.*) 213. This is a good example of the change in notions of good arguments (sec. 194).

⁵ *Ibid.*_t 244, 249.

⁶ *Ibid* ^ 235.

⁷ *ft_{id}* ^ 19g.

⁸ *Ibid.*) 326; *Canon Law*, Gratian's Com. on can. I, dist. **xxviiL**